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Abstract 
 
In recent years, al-Qaeda succeeded to perpetrate several terrorist attacks that were 
successfully calculated and executed. Each operation may be considered to be 
analyzed as a project. This paper analyses the events taken by al Qaeda prior to their 
operations, focusing on planning, controlling and decision making processes, using 
common tools from the project management area. This unique approach enables us 
understanding the operational aspects of al Qaeda and the managerial processes that 
its leaders were focused on. It was found that al Qaeda’s greatest managerial strength 
lies in human resource management, which includes team members recruiting, 
developing a clear organizational structure, team developing and team members 
motivating. Al Qaeda’s greatest weakness lies in time management, resulting with 
many operations’ schedule delays. 
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Introduction 
The al Qaeda’s attacks have been vastly discussed from many points of view. This 
paper is the first to analyze these operations using project management methodology. 
This approach analysis the managerial decision taken by al Qaeda’s leaders while 
preparing to these operations, aimed at finding its strengths and weaknesses. 
This analysis includes the major operations taken between 1993 and 2001 by 
al Qaeda, a terrorist network that was established in 1988 and has been led since then 
by Osama bin-Ladin. The major operations in this period and beyond are described in 
Table 1. 
Year City,  
Country 
People 
killed 
Comments 
1993 New York,  
US 
6 A bomb exploded under the World Trade Center 
in New York 
1995 Riyadh,  
Saudi Arabia  
5 A car bomb exploded outside a building leased by 
the Pentagon for American military contractors 
1996 Dhahran, 
Saudi Arabia 
19 US servicemen were killed in the Khobar Towers 
military complex 
1998 Kenya and 
Tanzania 
247 Two simultaneous attacks on US embassies 
2000 Sana,  
Yemen 
17 An attack on USS Cole 
2001 Washington, 
New York, US 
almost 
3,000 
Four airplanes attacks 
2002 Bali,  
Indonesia 
202 three bombs exploding killing western 
holidaymakers 
2002 Djerba, 
Tunisia 
21 Truck bomb exploded outside a synagogue 
2003 Istanbul, 
Turkey 
57 Several explosions 
2003 Casablanca, 
Morocco 
39 Five simultaneous attacks 
2004 Madrid,  
Spain 
200 Simultaneous explosions in three railway stations 
2005 London,  
UK 
52 Tube and bus systems were attacked 
Table 1 – Al Qaeda’s Major Operation between 1993 and 2001 
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All these operations were investigated and analyzed in books, papers and 
newspaper articles. The biggest operation, 9/11, was also investigated by the 
"National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States" (also known as 
"The 9/11 Commission").  
This paper focuses on the managerial processes taken by al Qaeda’s leaders 
prior to these operations and analyzes them according to common western project 
management methodologies. This unique approach can highlight new angles for some 
well known stories. Yet, in order to be able to make this analysis, let us first review 
relevant project management literature. 
 
Project Management Literature Review 
A project is a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique product or 
service (PMI, 2004). All al Qaeda’s operations fit this definition and share the main 
three most important project characteristics, as is recognized in literature (Kerzner, 
2001; Meredith & Mantel, 2003 and others), as follows: 
1. Uniqueness – All operations’ final outcome were very unique, where no event in 
history can be compared to be similar to in aspects of means taken, targets chosen 
and surprise. 
2. Temporary – these plot were planned and executed within timelines bounds, 
starting with a first idea in, usually ending with several simultaneously 
explosions. 
3. Predefined goals – These plots had clear goals defined by Bin Ladin. As happens 
in most projects, specific targets are changed throughout the project (i.e. the 
number of planes or the areas to attack in the 9/11 plot), but the main objectives 
and means remained unchanged. 
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A group of related projects managed in a coordinated way to obtain benefits and 
control not available from managing them individually are called a program (PMI, 
2004). The combination of all al Qaeda’s operations during these years can be 
identified as a program, since they shared the same global objective. Moreover, being 
managed by the same organization gave an opportunity of having a massive impact 
and the ability to learn from previous mistakes. Hence, we may see each al Qaeda’s 
operation as a separate project in a larger program.  
The PMBOK® (Project Management Institute, 2004) is the most common body of 
knowledge in the area of project management. It includes the identification of 44 
processes that should be performed by the project manager during the project’s or a 
program’s life cycle. These processes are grouped into nine knowledge areas, as 
follows: 
1. Integration – Includes integrative processes required to ensure that the various 
elements of the project are properly coordinated.  
2. Scope – This knowledge area makes sure that the project includes all and only 
the necessary work required to complete the project successfully. This knowledge 
area includes product scope (features and functions that are to be included in a 
product or service) and project scope (work that must be done in order to deliver 
a product as specified).  
3. Time – Scheduling is the process of integrating information regarding duration of 
activities, precedence relationships and required due dates, in order to determine 
the dates in which resources are to perform the various activities that are part of 
the project.  
4. Cost – Processes include planning and controlling the project budget.  
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5. Quality – Processes performed to reach the totality of features and characteristics 
of a product or service that bear on its ability to satisfy a customer's given needs.  
6. Human Resources – Processes required making effective use of the people 
involved in the project, including organizational planning, staff acquisition and 
team development.  
7. Communications – The processes required in order to assure the timely and 
appropriate generation, collection, dissemination, storage and ultimate disposition 
of project information. This knowledge area includes communications planning, 
information distribution, performance reporting and administrative closure.  
8. Risk Management – Processes dealing with identifying and reducing the 
project’s risk level, including risk management planning, risk identification, 
qualitative risk analysis, quantitative risk analysis, risk response planning and 
risk monitoring and control.  
9. Procurement - Processes require the acquisition of goods and services from 
outside the performing organization. This knowledge area includes: procurement 
planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract 
administration and contract closeout.  
Now that we have described the main body of knowledge in the area of project 
management, let’s analyze the al Qaeda’s operations according to these knowledge 
areas. We assume that the al Qaeda’s leaders were not aware of this methodology. 
Still, this analysis may serve to shed light on the managerial processes that were 
performed intuitively during these operations. 
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The al Qaeda’s Operations – Project Management Analysis 
Al Qaeda was established in 1988 by Osama Bin Ladin in order to spread jihad 
(Holy War) throughout the world. The “al Qaeda” word comes from the Arabic root 
qaf-ayn-dal, meaning a base, a foundation or a pedestal that supports a column 
(Burke, 2004). Al Qaeda is considered to be the fourth wave of terror’s flagship 
(Rapoport, 2004). This current wave follows three previous phases: (1) the first wave 
created the doctrine in the 19th century, (2) the second wave, between the two World 
Wars, described anti-colonial terrorists as “freedom fighters” and (3) the third wave, 
also called “new left wave” was represented by the Vietnam War, IRA and PLO. The 
fourth wave, also known as the “religious wave”, involves both Jews terror attacks 
(i.e. Abraham’s tomb, Hebron, 1994) and Christian terror (Oklahoma city bombing, 
1995). However, Islam is the heart of this wave (Rapoport, 2004). 
Most operations performed by al Qaeda between 1993 and 2005 can be defined as 
successful operations. Under project management's common success measures (PMI, 
2004), these operations can be defined as a great ‘success’: most of them were 
executed on time, stayed within the projected budget and met most of their objectives. 
Another project success measurement looks at opening new opportunities for the 
future (Dvir et al. 2003). In his analysis, Nacos (2003) forecasts that the suicide attack 
of 9/11 could well become an attractive model for future terrorist attacks. 
Before analyzing these successful projects using project management 
methodology, we may state that this common methodology was not developed for 
such projects, but it can still be the basis for a comparison. The analysis will be based 
on the traditional nine project management knowledge areas that were described 
earlier (PMI, 2004). 
 
  
7 
  
1. Integration 
Integration is the project knowledge area which merges all other knowledge 
areas. As it is the responsibility of the project manager to see the whole picture, we 
may assume that bin Ladin had the picture of the wood, while most of the 
participants could see only some of the trees in the forest. Moreover, a long-term, 
multiple attacks plan was always handy and updated. When a new idea was brought 
up, it was first had to be discussed and approved. For example, when Zuhair Hilal 
Mohammed al-Tubaiti suggested himself in 2000 to commit a suicide in any 
operation, he was asked to go away and formulate a plan to be submitted for approval 
like everyone else (Burke, 2004). 
In a project, “Integration” usually starts with a “project charter”, which defines 
the project objectives, desirable performances, budget and deadlines. This process 
can be compared to bin Ladin’s “Declaration of War”, which identifies specific 
targets. Bin Ladin prefers to focus on the “Crusader-Zionist” alliance supporting and 
manipulating them. He argues that the ‘greater enemy’ must be overcome the ‘lesser 
enemy’ (Burke, 2004). This approach is opposed to the common targets of other 
Islamic groups, which were focused on their own governments. 
In February 1998, when Osama bin Ladin and four other al Qaeda leaders issued 
a self-styled fatwa, publicly declaring that it was God's decree that every Muslim 
should try his utmost to kill any American, military or civilian, anywhere in the 
world, because of American occupation of Islam's holy places and general aggression 
against Muslims. All al Qaeda’s operations were part of this long term approach. 
Finally, we may say that a global plan with a wide view of the projects was 
always maintained and updated. Although no formal Integration tools, such as a 
formal project plan, were handy, this knowledge area was well covered. 
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2. Scope Management 
Scope management knowledge area includes scope planning, scope definition, 
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) creation, scope verification and scope control. 
The program’s scope was defined by bin Ladin and was focused, as stated earlier, on 
attacking American targets. This scope hasn’t been changed.  
In addition each project had its own scope, which was first defined, but often 
changed. For example, the 9/11 operation scope definition was changed several times 
during the project. Ramzi’s first idea included simultaneously destroying twelve 
passengers’ jets in the air, used to be called the “Bojinka plot” (Burke, 2004). The 
operation’s initial official scope definition included ten airplanes, both in the Eastern 
and Western coasts of the US. Osama bin Ladin decided to limit the scope of the 
operation in order to increase its chances of success. At a later stage, the project 
included the explosions of planes both in the US and East Asia. The scope was, once 
again, reduced by bin Ladin in the spring of 2000. He decided it would be too 
difficult to simultaneously coordinate a large-scale attack on two continents. These 
decisions fit project management literature know-how, which proves that smaller-
scale projects have much higher chances of success, compared to larger-scale 
projects (Johnson, et. al, 2001). 
The implementation of scope planning process included selecting the targets to 
be attacked. Bin Ladin wanted to destroy the White House and the Pentagon, KSM 
wanted to strike at the World Trade Center. All three of al Qaeda's leaders, bin Ladin, 
KSM and Mohamed Atef wanted to hit the Capitol. In the end, bin Ladin decided on 
the destinations of the four planes, including the two planes to New York and the two 
to Washington, D.C. 
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Another managerial process included in the Scope knowledge area is developing 
a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS). This tool hierarchically identifies the activities 
to be executed during the project. It seems that this tool was not being used by al 
Qaeda during any of the operations. Yet, looking back we are now able to chart the 
projects’ WBS. For example, the 9/11 project’s WBS may have looked like as 
follows: 
1. The Planes’ Operation 
1.1. Project team leaders 
1.1.1. Western culture training in Karachi, Pakistan 
1.1.2. Obtaining visas to the US 
1.1.3. Moving to the US 
1.1.4. Learning English 
1.1.5. Searching for an American wife 
1.1.6. Pilot training 
1.1.7. Plane certifications 
1.1.8. Obtaining driver’s licenses 
1.1.9. Purchasing plane tickets 
1.1.10. Purchasing small knives, GSP units and aeronautical charts 
1.2. Team members 
1.2.1. Staff searches of local mosques 
1.2.2. Staff approvals, made personally by bin Ladin 
1.2.3. Training courses at the Mes Aynak camp in Afghanistan 
1.2.4. Obtaining visas to the US 
1.2.5. Entering the US 
1.2.6. Obtaining driver’s licenses 
1.2.7. Gym training 
1.2.8. Dividing into teams according to English-speaking ability 
1.3. Communications 
1.3.1. Personal meetings with bin Ladin at the training camps 
1.3.2. Phone communications 
1.3.3. Electronic communications (e-mails, instant messaging)  
1.3.4. Communications using couriers flying to the US 
1.4. Intelligence 
1.4.1. Finding flight schools in the US 
1.4.2. Flight routes and schedules 
1.4.3. Security exercises 
1.5. Finances 
1.5.1. Raising money through funds 
1.5.2. Moving money to the US by cash 
1.5.3. Moving money to the US by bank transfers 
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Scope management is a very important knowledge area in the project 
management area. Most western project managers plan and strictly update their 
project’s scope. However, it seems that neither scope planning, nor configuration 
management processes were being performed to manage the frequent changes in the 
scope of al Qaeda’s operations. 
 
 
3. Time Management 
In this knowledge area the project manager has to define the project’s activities, 
sequence them, estimate activity resources, develop and control schedule. Tools 
included in this knowledge area are: network diagrams, a Gantt chart, a schedule 
control system and project management software.  
Although deadlines for al Qaeda’s operations have been appointed, in many cases 
the operation didn’t meet its schedule targets and had to be rescheduled. For 
example, the 9/11 attacks were planned for the end of 1999, but were postponed three 
times, first to May 2001, then to July and finally to September 2001, due to 
operational difficulties.  
Once the final date of an operation was approved, a detailed schedule was 
planned. However, no project management tools for time development, such as the 
Critical Path Method or a Gantt chart were being used. Trying to look back at the 
events of the 9/11 plot, may end with schedule planning which is presented in Figure 
1. The four planes were scheduled to depart within 25 minutes of each other, from 
07:45 to 08:10. Since the hijacking was scheduled for 30 minutes after takeoff, no 
kidnapping information was supposed to be revealed. Figure 1 presents the planned 
departure as represented by the left side of the upper rectangle, while hijacking 
planned points are represented by its right side, 30 minutes after take-off. 
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On 9/11, all four flights departed behind schedule. While three flights were ten to 
fourteen minutes late, the flight, which was planned to depart last, UA93 from New 
Jersey, had the longest delay, 42 minutes, due to morning traffic. Hence, a schedule 
gap of 43 minutes was established between planes, with AA11 departing at 07:59 and 
UA93 departing at 08:42. The differences of the actual versus the planned departures 
are represented by the white (planned) and actual (gray) triangles in Figure 1.  
The time gap among the flights increased even more when the AA11 team 
hijacked the airplane 30 minutes after planned departure, while the teams of flights 
UA175 and AA77 kept to the original schedule and hijacked their planes 30 minutes 
after actual departure. Moreover, the last plane to depart, UA93 from New Jersey, 
was hijacked only 46 minutes after its actual departure, meaning 42 minutes after 
AA11 had crashed into the north tower and 25 minutes after UA175 had crashed into 
the south tower of the World Trade Center. Figure 1 presents the first two plane 
crashes, represented by red stars, which happened before flight UA93 was even 
hijacked. The previous events created a time gap that allowed several passengers and 
crewmembers of UA93 to receive information about the first terror attacks. They 
understood that listening to the hijackers and sitting still would not bring them to 
safety. Finally, the fourth team could not accomplish their mission, due to passenger 
resistance, which caused the plane to crash in a field in Pennsylvania. 
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AA 11
UA175
AA 77
UA93
45 0 15 30 45 0 15 30 45 0 15 30 45 0 15 30 45
7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00
 
Legend: 
 
Figure 1 – Planned and actual flight schedule from departure to kidnapping 
 
Analyzing this knowledge area, we may see that no schedule development 
techniques were being used. Moreover, most operations were delayed and had to be 
reschedule. The failure in achieving schedule targets in the 9/11 plot may have 
caused the failure of the fourth plan. Hence, we may say that Time management can 
be defined as one of al Qaeda’s managerial weaknesses. 
 
4. Cost Management 
Budget was a main resource in al Qaeda’s operations. The project management 
literature suggest several tools to plan and control a project’s budget, including time-
cost trade-off analysis, total cost and project duration, which are interdependent, 
rescheduling of activities to change the budget profile and the associated cash flow, 
and crashing, which reduces activity duration by spending more money. 
Departure Kidnapping 
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In most operations, budget was limited; hence, cost planning and management 
were required. For example, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef had to build a smaller bomb for 
the 1993 World Trade Center explosion, due to being short of funds (Burke, 2004). 
According to al Qaeda’s manual, cost management includes separating the budget 
into two different accounts – one to be invested in projects and offer financial return 
and the other is to be saved and not spent except during operations, (Der Spiegel 
Magazine, 2002). 
The operations’ budget arrived from charities, government aid organizations, 
private businessmen, collections from congregations in mosques and private 
donations from wealthy individuals (Burke, 2004). 
Cost Breakdown Structure (CBS) is one of the processes from the project 
management area, aimed at analyzing project’s expenses. For example, the 9/11 
project’s cost was estimated to be below $500,000. Analyzing the project budget, 
reveals that most of it, estimated at $270,000, was spent in the US. According to the 
“9/11 committee” (2004) and Mickolus & Simmons (2002), the 9/11 project’s CBS 
is described as follows: 
1 Project Cost 
1.1 Travel expenses to obtain passports and visas 
1.2 Travel expenses to the US 
1.3 Expenses outside the US 
1.4 Expenses within the US 
1.4.1 Renting homes 
1.4.2 Funding pilots and material arts training 
1.4.3 Airfares tickets for 19 individuals 
1.5 Expenses made by people who ultimately didn't participate 
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There is no evidence of cost estimating, budgeting or control for al Qaeda’s 
operations. Considering al Qaeda's budget and security limitations, there is huge 
doubt that any were made. 
 
5. Quality Management 
The high quality of a project can be achieved through three managerial processes: 
quality planning, quality assurance and quality control. Tools included in this 
knowledge area are: quality audits, inspections, testing and control charts. 
The high quality of operations’ outcome was very important to the al Qaeda’s 
leaders. However, in some cases logistics and budget constraints damaged this target 
(i.e. the amount of explosion material that was used in the 1993 World Trade Center 
explosion). Yet, in most operations, achieving a high level of quality was the first 
priority. 
For example, in the 9/11 plot, in order to improve the quality of the project, the 
amount of fuel in the planes was a critical issue to consider. All four flights that were 
chosen departed from the east coast of the US (Boston, Washington, D.C and New 
Jersey) and were supposed to land on the west coast (San Francisco and Los 
Angeles). These were the longest routes - with the largest amount of fuel on board – 
but still considered a domestic flight. 
Quality assurance and control processes are other managerial tool to be used in a 
project. In order to achieve the desired level of quality, several tests were performed 
in the 9/11 plot to investigate airport security and project procedures. These tests 
were performed several times during the month prior to the attack. Testing lasted 
until the morning of 9/11, when Marwan al Shehhi, the leader of flight 175, flew 
from Portland to his starting point at Boston's Logan National Airport to reinsure 
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security levels. In summary, we may say that most quality tools were used in al 
Qaeda’s operation. 
 
6. Human Resources 
Project human resource management section includes the analysis of (1) al 
Qaeda’s organizational structure, (2) team recruiting, (3) operations’ Organizational 
Breakdown Structure (OBS) and (4) team developing. This section analyzes al 
Qaeda’s operations going through all these four phases. 
An organization’s structure highly impacts the management of its projects. Al 
Qaeda’s organizational structure is considered to be a complex one. Al Qaeda is 
defined as a network, rather than an organization (Raab and Milward, 2003). 
Mcallister (2004) claims that becoming an all-channel network was the result of poor 
strategy and indeterminate political goals. Lately, Mishal & Rosenthal (2005) 
classified al Qaeda as neither networked nor hierarchical, but as a new typology of 
terrorist organizations. 
Team recruiting to al Qaeda was considered to be with high priority to bin Ladin, 
who was sometimes personally involved. Most of al Qaeda's operations have 
included several operative groups that simultaneously carry out multiple attacks in 
one area using one method. This approach demands complicated recruiting 
processes. For example, in 1993 Bin Ladin sent Afghan veterans into Somalia to 
contact local tribes and to offer support and training. In 2000 Atta met candidates in 
Abu Dahbah (Der Spiegel Magazine, 2002). Christine (2004) claims that Al Qaeda 
likely does not have an explicit and dedicated recruiting infrastructure to recruit 
Pakistanis for its operations. Rather, Al Qaeda relies upon a web of informal 
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relations with groups based in Pakistan to gain access to operational collaborators 
and individuals to execute attacks within Pakistan. 
The people who take an active part in al Qaeda’s operations come from different 
backgrounds in terms of education, country of origin and extent of criminal 
background (Raab and Milward, 2003), but they were all committed to the idea. All 
men in the training schools in Afghanistan did so of their own volition. Despite the 
tight discipline, anyone who wanted to leave was allowed to go (Burke, 2004). 
Staff acquisition for the 9/11 plot began with recruiting KSM, the project 
initiator, Mohammed Atef, chief of operations and Mohamed Atta, tactical 
commander. Then, four other members, belonging to bin Ladin’s core group, were 
taken on as project participants. Later, four Muslims from Hamburg, Germany were 
added to the team as team leaders. Finally, the recruiting process included personal 
acquire in mosques and Afghanistan camps. The greatest recruiting challenge, 
according to an interview KSM gave al Jazeera, was to select suitable people who 
were familiar with the west (Burke, 2004). 
Most of the project team members were from Saudi Arabia, all were young - 
between the ages of 20-28 years old - most were not well educated, most were 
unemployed and unmarried and most spoke English poorly. Formal requirements for 
staffing were devotion to bin Ladin, veteran service and the ability to get a valid US 
visa. Neither understanding western culture nor the ability to speak English, were 
part of these requirements. 
Once recruiting project team members, the development of a hierarchical project 
structure is required. The 9/11 project structure was defined by the “9/11 
Commission" as being ‘dynamic’. The organization’s structure seems to have been 
based on prior trusted contacts among its members (New York Times, 2001). 
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The Organizational Breakdown Structure (OBS) of a project defines the 
hierarchical structure of team members that participating in a project. Although al 
Qaeda isn’t a hierarchical organization, complex operations, involving several groups 
require a structured definition of everyone’s positions. In a military organization like 
al Qaeda, the chain of command is very clear. For example, the 9/11 operation was 
performed by a total of 19 people, who were divided into four groups. Each group 
included one pilot with a pilot’s license. Three of the groups included five people, 
while the UA93 flight that crashed in Pennsylvania, included only four people. 
Mohamad al Kahtani, who was meant to be the fifth hijacker on flight UA93, had 
been refused entry to the US at Orlando International Airport in August 2001. Figure 
2 charts the 9/11 project’s OBS. 
 
Figure 2 – The 9/11 Project’s Organizational Breakdown Structure 
 
The last human resource management involves the development and 
management of the project team. Due to problems of distance and security, it was 
usually easier to manage the project teams separately, using the team leaders. Team 
leaders were responsible for mentoring and motivating their team members. This was 
accomplished in two ways. Firstly, religious promises were made regarding the good 
life waiting for them in Paradise, including a personal blessing from bin Ladin. 
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Marwan al Shehhi  
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Majed Moqed 
Salem al Hazmi 
Saeed al Ghamdi 
Ahmad al Haznawi 
Ahmed al Nami 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) 
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Secondly, money was spent to fund their western way of life for the few months prior 
to the operation.  
Team developing include building a high motivated group of people working 
together to achieve the same objective. Bin Ladin had the most motivated volunteers 
from the Afghanistan camps, due to his extreme ideas of attacking the US. Highly 
motivated people were personally selected for the operations. Keeping motivating 
those people throughout the whole operations, by the life-after-death promises, 
resulted in dedicated team members and a very useful human resource management 
process. 
For summary, all human resource management processes were well taken care 
in al Qaeda’s operations, starting with recruiting high quality team members, 
continuing with arranging them in clear positions and ending with keeping them 
highly motivated, in many case in their way do their own death. 
 
7. Communications 
The project management literature identifies four processes within this 
knowledge area including, communications planning, information distribution, 
performance reporting and managing stakeholders. Tools available within this 
knowledge area include stakeholders' analysis and developing communications 
management plans.  
Since the days of the war against the Soviets, bin Ladin had always been actually 
aware of the importance of the media (Burke, 2004). For example, he sent audiotapes 
of his lectures to be played at meetings of radicals in Pakistan gave some interviews 
to TV (CNN, al Jazeera, etc.) and paid money to selected journalists in Pakistan. 
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Although security limitations, bin Ladin tried to keep a large amount of 
communication transfer among the team members. Communications during the 
preparations included sending messages among project team members and the 
project manager. Communications included personal meetings as well, i.e. bin Ladin 
and KSM MET in the spring of 2000 in Afghanistan. However, close to the operation 
itself, communications among project teams were reduced to a minimum, due to 
security reasons. In the 9/11 plot, most of the terrorists didn’t know the identity of 
the other hijackers. Moreover, none of the hijackers, except the pilots, knew any of 
the planes’ destinations.  
Some of the communications throughout the 9/11 project were informal 
messages sent to Americans authorities. Bin Ladin led US intelligence to believe that 
he planned to release some prisoners from jail. Hence, the American troops were 
prepared to negotiate with hijackers on hijacked planes, far away from the actual 
scenario, they should have prepared to. Proper use of communications skills led to 
the most crucial element of this operation – the surprise.  
Some of the communications occurred between US immigration officers and the 
hijackers entering the US. While citizens’ basic freedoms and rights were carefully 
honored in the US, Miller (2002) claims that these security systems ensured the 
public increased security measures without compromising private citizens’ rights. 
On September 11th 2001, communications among the project teams were fluent. 
On 9/11 at 06:52, Mohamed Atta, the leader of flight 11, called Marwan al Shehhi, 
the leader of flight 175 for the operation’s final confirmation, only minutes after his 
earlier flight from Portland landed in Boston. 
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Finally, despite of partial information distribution capabilities, al Qaeda used 
more communications channels than most project managers in the western world, 
which are not even limited by security constraints. 
 
8. Risk Management 
Risk management processes aimed at reducing the level of the project’s risk. 
These processes include: risk management planning, risk identification, qualitative 
risk analysis, quantitative risk analysis, risk response planning and risk monitoring 
and control. Tools included in this knowledge area are: planning meetings, risk rating 
and risk control. 
One of the major risks of al Qaeda’s operations was an early warning from the 
American forces that would cancel the operation. One solution was preparing 
alternative options. For example for the 9/11 project, the alternative plan included 
Southeast Asia (Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia) and Jewish targets in New York. 
Another solution was checking the intelligence alerts on the day of the operation 
itself, just hours before the operation began. In the 9/11 project, Atta and Omari, who 
were part of American Airlines’ flight 11, scheduled to departure from Boston's 
Logan International Airport at 07:45, boarded a 6:00 a.m. flight from Portland to 
Boston. In doing so, they would be able to cancel the operation in case US officials 
arrested them. 
The risk of identifying weapons required for plane hijacking in security 
checkpoints before boarding was also considered and resolved. The biggest stroke of 
genius in this terrorist operation was that no weapons were required – the plane itself 
was the weapon, specifically its energy and fuel tanks. The minor weapons used were 
mace and pepper, which can't be detected by a walk-through metal detector. 
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Another risk was that the hijackers would be apprehended by some passengers on 
the plane on their way to the cockpit. Hence, all tickets were booked in first or 
business class, near the aisles. Moreover, all team members underwent physical 
training before the operation took place.  
During the operation’s preparation phase, the main risk was that one of the team 
members would be discovered and detained. This event could have caused the failure 
of the entire operation and led to the capture of its leaders. Krebs (2001) describes 
some of the techniques used by the team leaders to prevent this risk from happening 
and how they planned to reduce the damage, should it occur.  
Although American intelligence had no knowledge of the 9/11 project plan, an 
identified risk was the similar dates between project preparations at the end of 1999 
and the huge Millennium Celebration, scheduled to tale place in the US. At the end 
of 1999, security checks in US airports were high; this was the period when some of 
the hijackers intended entering the US in order to obtain pilot licenses and drivers’ 
licenses, hence no entries to the US were attempted in 1999. The first hijacker 
arrived at the Los Angeles International Airport on January 15, 2000. Since that date, 
hijackers successfully entered the US 33 times. 
However, one risk was not properly dealt with in the 9/11 project, which served 
to damage the operation. Morning flights from Newark airport usually depart late due 
to morning traffic. This information was available on several web sites. Flight UA93 
from New Jersey, scheduled to depart at 08:00 was 42 minutes late. Moreover, this 
plane was hijacked only 46 minutes after departure, instead of 30 minutes, as 
planned. This meant that while the plane was hijacked at 09:28, most passengers and 
flight attendants who called their families heard about the two airplanes crashing into 
the World Trade Center. This significant knowledge on the part of the passengers 
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ended with a failed attempt to crash the plane into the White House. The plane finally 
crashed in a field in Pennsylvania due to violent resistance on the part of the 
passengers and crew. 
A calculated risk taken by the project manager was in not delaying the 9/11 
operation, although only 19 hijackers had managed to enter the US. Mohammad al 
Kahtani, who was supposed to be the twentieth hijacker, had been refused entry to 
the US in August 2001. This decision eventually allowed the passengers of flight 93 
to attack the four hijackers on board. 
On August 16, 2001, three weeks before the operation, Moussaoui, who was 
planning to take part in the operation, was arrested by the INS on immigration 
charges. Communicating with the project leaders and reporting to them about the 
scenario could have damaged the operation. The decision taken was negligent. None 
of the project leaders knew of the arrest prior to 9/11. 
Finally, although not using project risk management tools, most major risks were 
identified and taking care of. In some cases, when the level of risk was quirt low, 
calculated risks were taken, just as the project management literature suggests. Yet, 
as happens in many projects, some risk events are not being taken care of. In the 9/11 
project, this may have led to the fourth’s plane unsuccessful attack. 
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9. Procurement Management 
Procurement management involves third parties in the project. Processes within 
this knowledge area include: plan purchases and acquisitions; plan contracting, 
requesting seller responses, selecting sellers, contract administration and contract 
closure. Tools included in this knowledge area are: make-or-buy analysis, contract 
negotiation and procurement audits. 
The projects teams were dependent on numerous external suppliers to fulfill the 
operations’ many needs. For example, the list of external suppliers involved in the 
9/11 project is presented in Table 2. 
# Supplier Purpose 
1.  US Government Visas to the US 
2.  US Government Drivers’ licenses 
3.  Training schools Pilot licenses 
4.  Private American citizens House rentals 
5.  Travel agencies  Airplane tickets 
Table 2 – The 9/11 Project’s External Suppliers 
 
Table 2 presents the high dependency of the project team on external suppliers. 
The team had no way of avoiding these contacts, although this increased their risk of 
exposure. Looking back, we may say that the minimal contact was made, ending with 
the achievement of the desired outcomes, without increasing the level of risk. 
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Conclusions 
In most western organizations, project managers are requested to pay a high level 
of attention to time and cost management (Zwikael & Globerson, 2004). This 
sometimes derives from project management software and customers’ priority that 
focuses on these areas. Al Qaeda, not having project management software and not 
caring much about project budget, didn't perform all the relevant project processes, 
included in the project management “Time” and “Cost” knowledge areas. We may 
also assume that cost management processes were not formally planned, documented 
and controlled due to security reasons. We may assume that schedule delays may 
have been reduced if al Qaeda had used project management time management tools 
and techniques. 
On the other hand, project managers in western cultures pay less attention to 
knowledge areas, such as communications and human resources management. The 
main reason for this is insufficient know-how in these areas and a lack of user-
friendly tools. Yet these knowledge areas have the greatest influence on project 
success. In this paper we found that al Qaeda focused on these knowledge areas and 
performed the relevant processes in accordance with project management 
methodologies. It included the processes of team members recruiting, developing a 
clear organizational structure, team developing and team members motivating. 
Hence, unlike western organizations, al Qaeda’s project management strengths in 
human resources and communications management is aligned with the areas that are 
most valuable to project success. 
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